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Abstract 
Wind turbine reliability studies have become 
more important because good wind turbine 
reliability with predictable turbine maintenance 
schedule will reduce the cost of energy and 
determine the success of a wind farm project. 
Previous research on wind turbine SCADA 
system has made progress in this respect. 
However, SCADA data volume is usually too 
huge and alarm information is too unclear to 
indicate failure root causes. In addition, SCADA 
signals and alarms are not currently interpreted 
as a whole. This highlights the need for more 
intelligent methods which can use existing 
SCADA data to automatically provide accurate 
WT failure diagnosis. This paper presents a 
new approach, based on Bayesian Network, to 
describe the relationship between wind turbine 
failure root causes and symptoms. The 
Bayesian Network model was derived from an 
existing probability-based analysis method – 
the Venn diagram, and based upon 26 months 
of historical SCADA data. The Bayesian 
Network reasoning results have shown that the 
Bayesian Network is a valuable tool for WT 
fault diagnosis and has great potential to 
rationalise failure root causes.  
Keywords: Wind Turbine, Bayesian Network, 
SCADA, Fault Diagnosis. 
1 Introduction 
Wind turbine (WT) downtime and Operation & 
Maintenance (O&M) costs constitute a sizable 
share of the annual cost of a wind farm (WF) 
[1]. With the increase of wind energy 
development, especially the rapidly growing 
number of offshore WFs, research regarding 
WT reliability is becoming significant and critical 
[2].  
The essence of improving the reliability of WT 
is to reduce the downtime and increase its 
availability by optimizing both the WT design 
and the maintenance schedule. Both of these 
strategies require a full understanding of the 
WT system and a detailed analysis of it failure 
mechanisms. WT monitoring systems provide a 
rich resource of data to achieve this as they 
archive comprehensive historical signal & alarm 
information, with detailed fault logs and 
environmental & operational conditions [3, 4, 5]. 
A WT’s systematic performance can be 
monitored through a proper analysis of the 
information collected by those monitoring 
systems which cover all the major WT sub-
assemblies. Initial attempts to use WT 
monitoring data, including Supervisory Control 
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Condition 
Monitoring systems (CMS) to detect WT failure 
have been made [6, 7]. This paper is a further 
study of Venn diagram analysis from [8], which 
focuses on using Bayesian Networks (BN) to 
analyse SCADA data and proves its feasibility 
on WT fault diagnosis. 
2 SCADA System 
WTs are monitored for a variety of reasons with 
different systems offering different analysis 
methods and possibilities for fault detection. 
Among them, SCADA system is a standard 
 
 
installation on large WTs and wind farms, their 
data being collected from individual WT 
controllers. According to [3] the SCADA system 
assesses the status of the WT and its sub-
assemblies using sensors fitted to the WT, 
such as anemometers, thermocouples and 
switches. The signals from these instruments 
are monitored and recorded at a low data rate, 
usually at 5 or 10 minute intervals.  
SCADA system contains signals and alarms 
and has been widely researched over the last 
decade [3, 6]. Some recent studies include 
signal-based analysis approaches for WT 
gearbox and generator [9], a system called 
SIMAP based on artificial neural network aimed 
to detect and diagnose gearbox failures [10], a 
probability analysis of pitch performance curves 
for identifying faults in pitch system [11], an 
automated analysis system also based on 
artificial neural network [3], time-sequence and 
probability based analysis method to rationalise 
and reduce SCADA alarm data [8], and a 
pattern recognition approach for identifying 
faults in WT pitch system [12].   
From above literature, it can be seen that the 
SCADA data volume is usually too huge and 
alarm information is too unclear to indicate 
failure root cause. In addition, SCADA signals 
and alarms are not interpreted as a whole. This 
highlights the need for more intelligent methods 
that can use existing SCADA data to 
automatically provide accurate WT failure 
diagnosis.   
This paper presents a new approach, based on 
BN, to describe the relationship between WT 
failure root causes and symptoms. The BN 
model was derived from the Venn diagram of 
[8]. Both SCADA signals and alarms are used 
to prove the great potential to rationalise failure 
root causes. 
3 Bayesian Networks 
BN are directed acyclic graph models for 
describing the relationships between causes 
and effects [13]. The model consists of nodes 
and arcs as shown in Figure 1. The nodes 
represent variables and the arcs express the 
probability dependences between the linked 
variables. In addition, each node in BN has an 
associated priori probability table - Node 
Probability Table (NPT) [13]. 
3.1 Constructing Bayesian Network 
The structure or topology of the BN should 
capture qualitative relationships between 
variables. In particular, two nodes should be 
connected directly if one affects or causes the 
other, with the arc indicating the direction of the 
effect. So, in our WT example, we might ask 
what factors affect a turbine’s chance of stop? 
If the answer is “Low Wind” and “Maintenance” 
then we should add arcs from “Low Wind” and 
“Maintenance” to “Turbine Stop”. Similarly, 
having turbine stop will affect the power output 
and the changes of nacelle temperature. So we 
add arcs from “Turbine Stop” to “Power Output” 
and “Nacelle Temperature”. The resultant is 
shown in Figure 1(a).  It is important to note 
that this is just one possible structure for the 
problem; the alternative network structure is 
shown in Figure 1(b) [13]. 
Maintenance Low Wind
Turbine Stop
Power Output
Nacelle 
Temperature
(a) (b)
Maintenance Low Wind
Turbine Stop
Power Output
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Figure 1: Two different BN models for WT case study 
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Figure 2: BN with node probability table 
3.2 Bayesian Network Learning 
The BN learning is done by specifying 
connectional probability distribution for each 
node, the NPT [13].  
For each node, we need to look at all the 
possible combination of values of those parent 
nodes. Each such combination is called an 
instantiation of the parent set. For each distinct 
instantiation of parent node values, we need to 
specify the probability that the child will take 
each of its values.  
For example, consider the “Turbine Stop” node 
of Figure 1 (a). Its parents are “Maintenance” 
and “Low Wind” and take the possible joint 
value                           . 
The conditional probability table specifies in 
order the probability of Turbine stop for each of 
these cases are:                      . Since 
these are probabilities, and must sum to one 
over all possible states of the “Turbine Stop” 
variable, the probability of turbine running is 
already implicitly given as one minus the above 
probabilities in each case; therefore, the 
probability of turbine running in the four 
possible parent instantiations are            
          , as shown in Figure 2.  
Root nodes also have an associated NPT, 
although it contains only one value 
representing its prior probabilities. In our 
example, the prior for a turbine under 
maintenance is given as 0.3, indicating that 
30% of population that the turbine sees are 
under maintenance.  
Clearly, if a node has many parents or if the 
parents can take a large number of values, the 
NPT can get very large. In fact, the size of the 
NPT is exponential growth with the increase of 
parent node numbers [13]. 
3.2 Maths behind Bayesian Networks 
BN are considered to be representations of 
joint probability distribution with the introduction 
of the independence assumption [13]. 
Consider a BN containing   nodes,    to   . A 
particular value in the joint distribution is 
represented by                     
   , or more compactly,              . The 
chain rule of probability theory allows us to 
factorise joint probabilities so: 
 
                              
                
                 
 
        
The structure of a BN implies that the value of a 
particular node is conditional only on the values 
of its parent nodes, thus the equation (1) is 
reduced to: 
 
                                
 
         
where                           denotes the 
set of parent of   . For example, by exampling 
Figure 2, we can simplify its joint probability 
expressions like below: 
 
                                
                                
                                    
                        
                    
                
 
 
                  
                      
                        
                
                
3.3 Reasoning with Bayesian 
Network 
The key feature of BN is that they enable us to 
model and reason about uncertainty. The BN 
forces the assessor to expose all assumptions 
about the impact of different forms of evidence 
and hence provides a visible auditable 
dependability.  
The BN reasoning is a simple step of 
calculating new belief when new information, 
which is called evidence, is available. Suppose 
we want to know the probability of Turbine is 
stop, given evidences                    , 
                  ,                 and 
           . Then, according to Bayes 
Theorem, the question can be expressed as: 
                              
   
                          
                      
 
   
                          
                             
 
 
After that, by using equation (2) and entering 
value from BN NPT, we can easily get the 
result. 
The uses of BN have been increasing in many 
domain problems and in many kinds of 
application, including but not limited to 
diagnosis problem and fault detection [14]. 
4 Implementation of Bayesian 
Network 
4.1 Bayesian Network Model 
A study using SCADA data to detect and locate 
faults in a 2MW variable speed WT’s electrical 
pitch system is presented. The BN model was 
derived from results of a Venn diagram 
probability-based analysis [8] and based upon 
26 months of historical SCADA data. 3 SCADA 
signals and 5 SCADA alarms were used in this 
study as shown in Table 1. 
Name Type Sampling 
Rate 
Description 
Power Output (Avg)  
Signal 
 
10 minutes 
Average power output in the past 10 minutes. 
Blade 1 Motor Torque 
(Max) 
Maximum blade 1 motor torque in the past 10 
minutes. 
Blade 1 Angle (Avg) Average blade 1 angle in the past 10 minutes. 
Blade 1 Emergency  
 
Alarm 
 
 
1 second 
Due to a fault, blade 1 feathers its angle of 
attack to 86º for a stop. 
PCP EFC PCP has initiated emergency feather control. 
SPA Fault in Blade 1 This alarm occurs due to a blade specific 
servo power amplifier fault. 
Short Circuit Blade 1 This alarm occurs due to power interruption 
caused to the blade 1’s inverter. 
Motor 1 Saturation Limit This alarm occurs due to motor over-current. 
Table 1: SCADA data used in this study 
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Motor 1 Saturation 
Limit
Short Circuit Blade 1
Power Output Avg
Motor 1 Torque Max
Blade 1 Angle Avg
WT
Status
Pitch 
Faults
Measured
Sensor
Outputs
 
Figure 2: BN model for WT pitch system
Figure 2 shows the derived BN model for a WT 
pitch system representing a knowledge 
structure that models the relationship between 
WT Status, Pitch Faults and Measured Sensor 
Outputs. 
4.2 Data Preparation 
The original SCADA data in Table 1 is required 
to be processed to resolve the following 
problems: 
 Representation: Signals are 
continuous data and are difficult to 
represent WT running status; 
 Inconsistency: Signals and alarms 
have different sampling rate; 
Therefore, Signal Variance (   ) and Alarm 
Presence Length (  ) are introduced. The    is 
defined as: 
                    
where    denotes the Signal Variance at time  . 
    and      represent the original SCADA 
signal data at time   and     respectively. 
Where    denotes the Alarm Presence Length 
in seconds from time     to  , defined as: 
                   
  is a function used to calculate the amount of 
time in seconds. Equation (4) will update Alarm 
sampling rate from 1 second to 10 minutes to 
make it consistent with the SCADA signal. 
After that, indicator functions are introduced to 
represent SCADA data in different data range, 
defined as: 
        
                                                
                                     
                                            
          
        
                                                  
                                        
                                                
         
       
                                                                
                                                     
                                                                   
        
where equation (5) is for Power Output and 
equation (6) is for Blade 1 Motor Torque and 
Blade 1 Angle. Equation (7) is applied on all 
alarms. 
4.3 Training Bayesian Network 
A WT’s 26 months SCADA data was used to 
train the BN and obtain corresponding 
probabilistic dependencies. The trained result is 
shown in Figure 3, named the BN with the 
given priori probability. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Trained BN with the given priori probability (Note: Data from healthy condition has been 
filtered as they occupied most of the training data) 
(a) (b)
(d) (e) (f)
(c)
 
Figure 4: (a) The Venn diagram result from [8], (b)-(f) the BN reasoning with different given 
evidence(s) (The given evidences are highlighted by filling red colour).
4.4 BN Reasoning 
BN are a way of describing complex 
probabilistic reasoning. By giving user knows 
posterior probabilities (also known as 
evidences), the network is able to infer the 
probabilities of other events, which haven’t as 
yet been observed. Some BN reasoning tests, 
with the given evidences, are shown in Figure 4 
and Figure 5; the corresponding inference 
results are highlighted in red circle. 
 
 
The probability-based analysis result from [9] is 
shown in Figure 4 (a). This result indicated 
Blade Short Circuit was the root cause of the 
pitch system failure on this occasion. Figure 4 
(b)-(f) show the derived BN model used for 
reasoning with the given evidence(s). Figure 4 
(b) shows the BN reasoning with the given 
evidence of serious PCP EFC. By comparing 
this inference results with the initial trained BN 
in Figure 3, we could find that the probability of 
SPA Fault, Motor Saturation Limit and Blade 
Short Circuit have been increased. Also, in this 
situation, in order to initialise the blade 
emergency feather control, Blade Motor Torque 
is required to increase Blade Angle and result 
in decreasing Power Output, as shown in 
Figure 4 (b) and highlighted in red circle.  
Figure 4 (c) shows the evidence of serious 
Blade Emergency was added into the BN 
model. By comparing this result with previous 
one, we found the new result has got the 
increased probabilities (As highlighted in red 
circle). This could be explained as the PCP has 
initialised the emergency control and the blade 
had also feathered its angle of attack for a stop, 
consequently, the probability of pitch fault is 
increased and corresponding measured 
outputs are changed to indicate the WT running 
status.   
The evidence of decreasing Power Output was 
added in Figure 4 (d) and the result shows a 
greater fault probability. This is quite easy to 
understand as blade feathers its angle of attack 
for a stop will definitely result in decreasing 
Power Output. On the contrary, the added 
evidence of decreasing Power Output will lead 
to a corresponding increase in event 
probability. Figure 4 (e) and (f) show the BN 
reasoning with adding the evidence of 
increasing Motor Torque and Blade Angle 
respectively. Their inference results show the 
gradual increase in the change of the events’ 
probabilities.  
Through analysing the results from Figure 4 (b) 
to (f), we found the BN reasoning exactly infer 
the probabilities of the other events. By simply 
inputting the current WT’s running status as 
evidence, this model can be applied online to 
diagnose WT faults. 
Another three BN reasoning tests are shown in 
Figure 5 to represent a WT with and without 
pitch faults. 
 
(a) (b) (c)  
Figure 5: (a) A WT with pitch fault, (b) and (c) A WT without pitch fault. 
Figure 5 (a) shows the BN reasoning with the 
given evidence of serious Blade Short Circuit. 
According to this result, we found that a WT 
with Blade Short Circuit will certainly have the 
occurrence of PCP EFC, SPA Fault and Blade 
Emergency. It will also have a large probability 
of Motor Saturation Limit. And in this situation, 
the WT will require big Blade Motor Torque to 
increase the Blade Angle and result in 
decreasing Power Output. Above BN 
inferences clearly reflects the preventive 
actions when a pitch fault occurred and it also 
proved the result of the probability-based 
analysis [8], as shown in Figure 4 (a). 
 
 
Figure 5 (b) shows the BN reasoning with the 
given evidence of no PCP EFC and increasing 
Power Output.  The BN reasoning results show 
no fault and the WT is running under good 
condition. Figure 5 (c) shows the similar results 
when BN is given the evidence of no PCP EFC 
and constant Power Output. 
5 Discussion 
In this work, the BN model was derived from 
results of a Venn diagram probability-based 
analysis [8] and based upon 26 months of 
historical SCADA data. The trained BN has 
shown its feasibility to reason root causes in 
the presence of uncertainty. Comparing to the 
Venn diagram approach, the BN has the 
following advantages: 
 Better rationalisation of the data: 
This is because in BN models, there is 
a relationship between cause and 
effect; 
 More feasible for online fault 
diagnosis: By inputting the current WT 
running status as evidence(s), the BN 
will be able to infer the probability of 
other events, E.g. a fault probability; 
A drawback of using BN found from this work 
was that the BN complexity grows exponentially 
with the increase of parent node numbers. In 
addition, the size of training data is critical to 
the success of BN reasoning. So for better 
performance, large numbers of training data 
covering a wider range of representative 
symptoms are needed to assure BN 
performance. 
6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study of the suitability of BN 
for the diagnosis of WT pitch system faults has 
demonstrated that it is a valid technique for 
automatic WT fault root cause detection.  
The results show that the BN approach has the 
potential to reduce WT O&M cost by making 
accurate detection, diagnosis and prognosis. 
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